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In the Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception, Bence Nanay argues that views
familiar to the field of philosophy of perception stand to enrich the field of
aesthetics. His broad conception of perception includes ‘cross-modal influ-
ences, categorization, conceptualisation and all kinds of top-down influences
from non-perceptual processes’ plus ‘attention’ (7). In the first chapter, he
demarcates aesthetics from the philosophy of art and suggests that philos-
ophy of perception’s alternate role as the philosophy of experience proves
especially relevant for aesthetic experience. Over the next five chapters, he
develops five perceptual processes that he considers particular to aesthetic
experience: distributed attention, a ‘threefoldness account’ of picture per-
ception, aesthetically-relevant properties, semi-formalism and uniqueness. In
sum, when we have an aesthetic experience, we treat an artwork as unique.
Lacking a blueprint to follow, we must attend to everything, which warrants
‘distributed attention’ (127). Verging slightly from this discussion, the last
two chapters explore the advent of twofoldness and vicarious experiences’
dependence on non-distributed attention.
While I wholeheartedly endorse Nanay’s claim that aestheticians should
be more savvy about philosophy of perception, his methodology seems to
contradict what philosophers of perception actually do. They show how ev-
erything in our environment modifies our perceptions. Since perception is
multi-modal, there’s probably no such thing as looking at pictures the way
Nanay describes. Nanay attributes his notion of aesthetic experience to hours
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spent studying pictures with Richard Wollheim. Terming this process ‘aes-
thetic attention’ (p. 25), he argues that distributed attention, such that we
free up our minds to take in an object’s myriad properties, optimises aesthetic
experience. ‘You are trying to make sense of the object by trying out attend-
ing to a wide variety of its properties – just as you would do with an object
you have never encountered before’ (134). Strangely, Nanay never identifies
attention’s source, as if spectators freely direct their attentions at will, but
this is especially difficult when puzzling artworks overwhelm our thoughts. He
notes that Monroe Beardsley singled-out singletons (29), yet Nanay ignores
his having actually credited objects with directing our attention.
While I heartily endorse Wollheim’s warm-up exercise (eerily reminiscent
of Alfred Barnes), it is woefully inadequate so long as it ignores the artwork’s
environment and presentational history. Even if we perceive one picture at
a time, we remain mindful of its prior contexts. Moreover, perception is
comparative. Studying several things at once helps us grasp more of each.
Our facility with colours, forms, styles, symbols, themes and genres arises
from our ability to compare and contrast properties between extant things,
present or not. Like food plating, wall colours modify artworks’ colours. A
well-placed bench can improve a long-term observer’s aesthetic experience,
even if it doesn’t warrant aesthetic attention. Since the environment influ-
ences what we attend to, Nanay’s imagining artworks extracted from their
environments effectively cleaves spectators from world.
Given that we never experience one artwork at a time, save perhaps at
art auctions, Nanay’s focus on unique singletons (solitary pictures extracted
from their constitutive set on display) seems superfluous. Aesthetics certainly
could benefit from philosophers’ assessments of Charles Spence’s restaurant
research or Tröndle and Kirchberg’s museum studies, but Nanay ignores their
findings. For example, researchers evaluating diners’ experiences study how
everything present impacts their aesthetic experience, including their mood,
table companions, utensils, plate shapes, ambient music, plating, plate angles
and finally the food. After twenty years of research, it is clear that food is
not isolatable, inspiring chefs keen to improve aesthetic experiences to fine-
tune environments. By comparison, Nanay focuses exclusively on the food;
isolating objects for observation, as if their presentations and contexts play
no role in availing what he terms aesthetically-relevant properties (ARPs).
Initially, I suspected that his aesthetic ‘semi-formalism’, which privileges
visually salient properties (94) over imaginative interpretations (105), is a
holdover from his early days as a film critic. But I now see that Nanay’s
view is predicated on an assumption that aesthetic experiences trigger mental
imagery, not mere thoughts of x, such as thoughts of events. He rightly advises
critics use ARPs to bolster their evaluative judgements, yet the conceptual
art cases he analyses to flesh out ARPs tend to derive their ARPs from
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conventional knowledge, which can take decades to secure. When I experience
Duchamp’s Mona Lisa Rasée (1965), I recall L.H.O.O.Q. (1919) and certainly
connect the two events, but I don’t register a mental image of the earlier
work. In fact, it is nearly impossible to memorise interesting artworks, let
alone visualise them in our mind’s eye. When we experience them in person,
they stimulate us to recall everything we know about them.
Although Nanay’s advice for critics is well-founded, I don’t see ARPs
replacing aesthetic properties as conceived by Frank Sibley. We defer to
aesthetic concepts precisely because we cannot specify the very properties to
which he insists we attend. For example, the critic describing Rauschenberg’s
Erased de Kooning (1953) during its first exhibition would have had no ac-
cess to its imperceptible ARP, which hinges on artistic fame and was hardly
self-evident in 1963. I wonder whether Nanay has ever assessed a curated
exhibition’s success at availing ARPs. To formulate each painting p’s con-
stitutive dependence on its semi-formal properties q, he writes ‘If p depends
constitutively on q then q makes p what it is’ (100). As it turns out, this
same formulation applies to curated exhibitions, whose set members’ consti-
tutive dependence prompts the very thoughts of x that guide spectators to
negotiate the artworks on view.
I worry that Nanay’s tying aesthetic experience to isolated pictures suffers
the same problem that Fred Dretske’s ‘Goldilocks’ thought experiment does.
Aiming to defeat cognitive penetration, Dretske claims that if a pine-tree
expert and a novice paint what they see, their resulting pine-tree paintings
would look alike, assuming identical rendering skills. Nanay who upholds
cognitive penetration knows this is not so (148), yet he still implores novices
to employ aesthetic attention distributively, as if their experiences could re-
semble those of experts. Novices may be unprompted, but cognitive pene-
tration eschews parity (132). Given his decidedly ‘un-enactive’ stance, his
well-meaning technique would benefit from an understanding of how exhibi-
tions direct spectators to pick out ARPs and the way the imagination assists
novices (typical of school children). Nanay expects his methodology to aug-
ment aesthetic differences, but it actually has the opposite effect for social
viewers who claim that attending to artwork contents diminishes their aes-
thetic experiences.
The seventh chapter builds on what came before but reorients our vantage
from looking at a picture to looking backwards through history to determine
when twofold attention (attending to the relationship between scene and sur-
face) became de rigeur. Although Nanay concludes that ‘our visual experience
of looking at pictures changed in the sixteenth century’ (156), he strangely
never mentions vanishing points, whose absence from East Asian art could
explain East Asian spectators’ attention to background context, which he
does discuss (156-158). Nanay ends with a delightful analysis of how vicari-
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ous experiences coupled with epistemic asymmetries lead us to identify and
engage with those characters we read about or observe, whether in person,
in literature or in film. Interestingly enough, his account of vicarious expe-
riences tethers spectators to world in ways his aesthetic-attention technique
nixes.
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